Observations on the CPA, Darfur, and AMIS’s Role in the War (by Peter Schumann)

A new post on the SSRC "Making Sense of Darfur" blog...

Posted on behalf of Peter Schumann, a former UNDP staff member with extensive experience in UN [peacekeeping] operations, most recently as the Regional Coordinator and Representative of UNMIS in Southern Sudan.

One of the last activities [that] I was involved with was facilitating to strengthen the political relationship between the SPLM and the ‘Darfur Rebels` - we had two very important meetings in Juba, pre- and post-Abuja. Surprisingly (?) the UN–AU [mediation] was not amused about the growing linkage between these two political groupings[;] it seemed that they saw this initiative more as a threat to their approach to form a common platform in Darfur, ignoring to a large extent the role of the SPLM. In my view, these events between July and September/October 2007 need to be investigated in more detail.

Second observation – the debate about the performance of AMIS in Darfur must take place, but based on empirical facts. It should, for example, centre on the question of PKO standards and operational goals, applied to AU and UN forces. Based my own observations in Darfur during 2005 and 2006, it became increasingly obvious that AMIS was set-up to fail – a UN PKO would not be authorized to deploy in a hostile environment under the operational and political conditions which were, to a large extent, imposed on the AU.

Third observation – it [...] would be politically wrong to separate the CPA from the rest of Sudan, in particular Darfur. The non-compliance to withdraw SAF troops from Southern Sudan, in particular Sector III, coincided with key events affecting Darfur. The [international community] through the UN SC [i.e., Security Council] was pressuring the NCP to agree to a [hybrid operation] in Darfur. The UN SC visited Khartoum in June 2007 for this very purpose, without putting pressure on Khartoum to comply with the CPA[;] the UN SC did not even mention the CPA at the time. The message [that] the UN SC was sending was obvious – the focus is Darfur, not Southern Sudan, i.e. the Council fell into the Khartoum logic of separating Darfur from the CPA, a position [that] the Council had already taken in 2004! The frustration in Juba was immense, and the general feeling was that Southern Sudan and the CPA “was up for graps”! Neither UNMIS nor the AU–UN [mediation] undertook any action to counter this impression.

The next couple of months will in all likelihood see a deterioration of the security situation in Southern Sudan and in Darfur. The CPA will continue be dishonoured, in particular, and all provisions related to the key Naivasha principles, in particular the right for self determination, with an escalation of military conflict focusing on the oil fields in Sector III. The deployment of UNAMID will focus on the military-security dimension, and will result in the well-[known] tussles with Khartoum over import of equipment and granting of visas and travel permits. All this will keep the UN and AU bureaucracies very preoccupied – do not underestimate the challenges to build a large-scale integrated Mission under hostile conditions! Khartoum has mastered the art to divide and rule the UN bureaucracy[;] with the AU on board, it will be even easier to divert attention from a political programme, in support of forces in Sudan who want change, lasting and honest change to a system of governance which does not thrive on marginalization and instability, but which guarantees the survival and well being of all Sudanese.