AMIS Fatalities: The Cost of Peacekeeping or Symptoms of Weakness? / The Haskanita Incident and the Challenges Facing the AU-UN Hybrid Force to Darfur (by Festus Aboagye and Henri Boshoff of ISS)

Tuesday's two-part "ISS Today" analysis...

Part 1: AMIS Fatalities: The Cost of Peacekeeping or Symptoms of Weakness?

The challenges to peace implementation in Darfur turned tragic on 29 September, when 10 members of the AU Mission in Sudan-Darfur [sic] (AMIS) were killed in an attack by one of the rebel militia groups. The attack on the AMIS camp in Haskanita, which was under the protection of a Nigerian company, initially left 20 missing and has brought AU fatalities to an estimated 52 killed since the inception of the mission in April 2004.

In the aftermath of the attack, the debate in the media has centred on the need for the deployment of the joint UN-AU [hybrid operation] in Darfur (UNAMID), which was established on the strength of UN Security Council Resolution 1769 (2000) of 31 July 2007, to be hastened. The debate has largely served to raise expectations within the international community that the deployment of UNAMID will be a panacea for the humanitarian tragedy in Darfur.  Such a perception is, however, misguided, and may do more damage than good. This view is shared by the UNAMID Force Commander, Lieutenant General Martin Luther Agwai of Nigeria, who was quick to dispel any notions of a quick fix by UNAMID.

The debate should focus on the underlying factors that led to the tragic fatalities of AMIS. The simple logic is that, [in order] to be able to protect the vulnerable civilian population of Darfur, the mission must first be able to ensure its own security. The fact that this has not been the case so far therefore raises fundamental questions about the possibility of further attacks against AMIS and UNAMID, the effectiveness of the peace operation, and the prospects for success of the peace process and peace implementation.

Darfur is a complex humanitarian emergency that requires a robust mandate in order to address serious crimes, crimes against humanity and, arguably, genocide. This imperative demands not only the large numbers of peacekeepers that have become synonymous with regional and UN peacekeeping within the continent. More importantly, it also requires well-trained and well-equipped troops, and formed police units, with substantive combat and mission-support capabilities.

So, why is it that, in spite of the tremendous support that has been provided by the international community, AMIS’ overall capabilities have not been optimal? In addition to the perceived funding and logistical shortfalls, including the comparatively small size of AMIS (7,700-8000), the mission’s capacity for mission accomplishment has also been compromised by delays arising out of the AU’s lack of institutional expertise and capacity to provide donors with timely reports. More fundamentally, AMIS has lacked international legitimacy, due to the regional nature of the mission. As a result, AMIS has not been able to stabilise the Darfur region, let alone create an environment conducive to deepening the peace process.

This is by no means an indictment of the AU and AMIS because, contrary to the notion that the AU is obliged to find African solutions to African problems, the reality is that AU missions, as originally conceived, were always intended to serve as short-term interventions aimed at create the political conditions necessary for a hand-over of the mandate to the UN. The regionalism or regionalisation of African missions has therefore not helped to meet this cardinal principle of peacekeeping.

It has taken far too long for the transition to take place, leading to the stagnation of the peace process, the entrenchment of political positions by the respective warring parties, and the intensification of the conflict (including the proliferation of rebel movements) at a time when the peace implementation is faced with the prospects of serious setbacks.

The attack on the AMIS position threatens to weaken the already-fragile international legitimacy of the mission. It also threatens to weaken the political commitment of the contributing countries, such as Senegal, whose government has indicated in the strongest terms that it will consider pulling out its contingent, if the AU does not take steps to ensure mission security. Even though Senegal provides only about 10 percent of the AMIS troop strength (522 personnel in a 487-strong battalion and 40 military observers), its threat is significant for the reason that it will undermine the principle of sustained political commitment from contributing countries.

The recent tragedy also draws attention to other operational predicaments of the mission. In the wake of the attack, the Force Commander stated in the media that AMIS might have fallen for the age-old ‘cry wolf’ syndrome. Because earlier threats of attack by the warring parties had not materialised, AMIS appears to have ignored credible threats of an attack against the mission. This suggests that the mission was taken by surprise, and could do little or nothing to protect itself.

Even if the AMIS force had received, and acted on, intelligence indicating an imminent attack, it seems likely that the outcome would not have been significantly different. Despite having been occupied by AMiS for about four years, the position in Haskanita had only limited entrenchments without substantive overhead protection, and had no bunkers or earthworks around its positions. The peacekeepers were, at the time of the attack, resting inside tents behind wire fences that are no protection against flat-trajectory small-arms weapons, let alone high-trajectory weapons. This operational weakness was caused by a lack of the engineering capabilities needed to put in place protection facilities beyond basic rifle trenches.

While mourning the unnecessary loss of peacekeepers, it is important to learn the right lessons [in order] to safeguard the lives of peacekeepers. The right capabilities must be provided for mandate accomplishment. Once these are in place, it will then be a matter of professional leadership, in accordance with appropriate standard operating procedures, to ensure the operational and tactical safety and security of peacekeepers.

Festus Aboagye, Head of the Training for Peace Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)

Part 2: The  Haskanita Incident and the Challenges Facing the AU-UN Hybrid Force to Darfur

The Haskanita attack on AMIS peacekeepers on 29th [September] 2007 has once again shown that the AU force does not have the capacity to protect either civilians or the humanitarian community in Darfur. This has everything to do with the original mandate of the mission, and the way in which the mission was set up. The mission was planned to be an observer mission with a protection element. Because of the ongoing violence, the task to protect civilians and humanitarian workers was later added to the original mandate. AMIS was not, however, given the additional enablers (such as attack helicopters, transport helicopters, or highly mobile mechanised capabilities) necessary to actually carry out this task.

The Haskanita incident raises the important questions of force protection and reaction capability. Although the detailed investigation into the events at Haskanita has yet to be completed, remarks like that of Abdoulaye Wade emphasise the concern of potential troop-contributing countries. Wade, the president of Senegal, which has contributed about 540 troops to AMIS, threatened to pull his soldiers out of Darfur, if it transpired that the Haskanita peacekeepers lost their lives because of a lack of equipment. One of the soldiers killed in Haskanita was Senegalese.

The AU was less pessimistic about the repercussions. “The UN is preparing to deploy forces. That’s on schedule. From October, they should start deploying,” said AU peace and security spokesman Assane Ba. “I don’t think [that] the incident will have any impact.”

Despite such confident statements, there is little doubt that the newly announced AU-UN hybrid operation (UNAMID, the UN/African Union Mission in Darfur) is already facing significant challenges. The first looming problem is the make-up of the UNAMID force. Both Khartoum and the African Union insist that there are more than enough contributions from African nations, and that proposed contributions from non-African nations (such as Thailand, Uruguay, and Norway) are unnecessary. But African nations have a dismal history of failing to make good on offers of personnel and resources. The AU has missed every deployment deadline for force enhancement in Darfur since first deploying in summer 2004. In addition, the importance of technical, engineering, logistical, and transport personnel to the success of the UNAMID mission has been repeatedly underscored. Yet it is widely acknowledged that these critical skills are generally lacking in African military forces. Perhaps the greatest need is for trained civilian police, which are in particularly short supply in Africa. Capable civilian police are critical to the success of the mission, and should be deployed on an expedited basis to the camps and humanitarian sites that are most acutely threatened.

Romeo Dallaire, UN force commander during the Rwandan genocide, has also been explicit about what must be demanded by the force commander for the UN/AU hybrid force. “It is beyond dispute that African states themselves simply cannot provide nearly 20,000 qualified troops (nor enough police). UNAMID needs attack helicopters, engineers, big cargo lorries, communications, and other capabilities that African states also cannot provide.”

The second challenge is that of the mandate. For one thing, Resolution 1769 has already been stripped of the crucial tasking to disarm combatants, even those carrying weapons introduced into Darfur in violation of a UN arms embargo.  Then there is the challenge of ‘the responsibility to protect’. On paper, the mandate of the UNAMID force to protect civilians and humanitarians could not be more explicit. Unfortunately, this crucial tasking is already being disputed and downplayed by the Government of Sudan. General Majzoub Rahamah, the officer in charge of international relations at the Defense Ministry of Sudan, has said that the military personnel in the [(]UN/AU[)] hybrid operation do not have the right to protect civilians. The Government of Sudan will in all likelihood point to the phrase “without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan” in Resolution 1769 as a basis for their argument. This endangers the very essence of the mission, which is to protect civilians. If this issue is not resolved, the mission will have no impact on the dire situation in Darfur.

Another concern is the critical importance of receiving sustained support from the government of Sudan on operational issues such as the need for land for the building of UNAMID camps, provision of airport landing rights for heavy aircraft, clearance for night flights, an agreement to drill for water, and full freedom of movement for the operation. Countries such as South Africa and Rwanda have in the past been frustrated by restrictions placed by the Government of Sudan on their forces deployed in Darfur, and have had difficulties in supporting those forces as a result.

Then there is the problem of Command and Control. The language of Resolution 1769 is ambiguous on this critical issue:

“[the Security Council] decides that there will be unity of command and control which, in accordance with basic principles of peacekeeping, means a single chain of command, further decides that command-and-control structure and backstopping will be provided by the United Nations, and, in this context, recalls the conclusions of the Addis Ababa high-level consultation on the situation in Darfur of 16 November [2006].”

So who is in charge? What does UN “backstopping” really mean?  Where does the authority of the UNAMID field commander, General Martin Agwai, end? Where does the authority of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations begin? Does General Agwai report to Addis Ababa or [to] New York? To whom does he turn for support in his decision-making? These questions have not been answered, and must be cleared as a matter of urgency, with the planned deployment of the mission only three months away.

Henri Boshoff, Military Analyst: Africa Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)